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PATENT INCENTIVES IN THE
SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY
Dan Callaway*

INTRODUCTION

The semiconductor industry comprises organizations of all sizes, from
single engineers contracting their work to companies as large and powerful
as have ever existed. The rapid advancement of technology in the
semiconductor field makes it a crucible for theories about the patent system
as a whole. It is arguably desirable that as new technologies come to
market, patents should be issued with appropriate scope so that other
inventors retain incentive to innovate.' But it is not only the Patent Office
which can offer or hinder incentives for inventors. The semiconductor
industry is subjected to various incentives, both negative and positive, from
Congress, the courts, and from within.
Part A of this paper will survey the semiconductor industry and the
Part B will look at
incentives for patenting integrated circuits.
disincentives, and problems that have arisen in the industry. Part C focuses
particularly on patent issues relating to "interface circuits"--those circuits
that directly connect a chip to the outside world.
I. PATENT INCENTIVES IN THE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY

1. The semiconductor market's rapid development and reliance on fresh
ideas make it a laboratory for intellectual property law. The story of the
" J.D. Candidate, 2008, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; M.S., Electrical
Engineering 2000, Johns Hopkins University. Special thanks to Professor Jeffrey A. Lefstin for his
expert guidance.
1. See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90
COLUM. L. REv. 839, 843 (1990).
HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 4:1

555 Timer illustrates the nature of the market.
The market for semiconductors is broad and diverse, incorporating the
entire consumer electronics field, among others. The computers, music
players, and cell phones purchased by consumers almost always contain
semiconductor chips from various manufacturers. Some of these chips are
designed with a very specific use in mind, and may even be manufactured
by the consumer electronics company itself.2 Such chips are called
"ASICS," or Application-Specific Integrated Circuits.3
While such
customization is cost-effective and may be a desirable form of vertical
integration for electronics companies,4 it drastically complicates the process
of designing a product.5
While ASICS are on the cutting edge, the more traditional process of
designing an electronic product involves using "off-the-shelf" or generalpurpose chips that perform common functions.6 For example, one common
type of general-purpose chip is a timer. Timer chips both provide signals
of stable frequency and measure frequencies coming from other chips.7
One timer design, the "555" style, was introduced by Signetics in 1971.8
The chip became so popular that other companies copied the design and
manufactured it, and today numerous companies -manufacture their own
interchangeable variants of the 555 chip, many still identical to the
original. 9 Over one billion of the chips, under various trade names, are sold
every year worldwide, ° making it the most popular chip every single year

2. Junko Yoshida, 'Synergy' plan in play at Sony, EE TtIMES ONLINE, Mar. 11, 2005,
http://www.embedded.com/showArticle.jhtml?articlelD=159901574 (last visited Apr. 2007).
But Sony wasn't willing to live with lower margins, especially for
Playstation. In unveiling the Playstation Portable in Tokyo last fall, Kutaragi said
the game division relied on Sony's semiconductor operations for 50 percent of
the box's component value. Aggressive pricing was only possible, he said,
because key ICs were designed and fabricated internally, using a 90nm process.
'You can't pull off this kind of pricing by depending on off-the-shelf
components,' Kutaragi said. The first-generation Playstation, by contrast, used
ASICs from LSI Logic, a graphics chip from Toshiba, and memory from NEC,
Mitsubishi, Toshiba and Hitachi. The only key internally developed component
was a Sony disk drive, Kutaragi said.
Id.
3. FRANCO MALOBERTI, RANDEEP SINGH SOIN, ANALOGUE-DIGITAL
TECHNIQUES, DESIGN TOOLS AND APPLICATIONS 13 (Jos6 Franca ed., LEE 1991).

AsIcs:

CIRCUIT

4. Yoshida, supra note 2.
5. Id.
6. Id
7. PAUL SCHERZ, PRACTICAL ELECTRONICS FOR INVENTORS 270 (lst ed. 2000).

8. HANS CAMENZIND, DESIGNING ANALOG CHIPS 11-3, 11-4 (BookSurge Publishing, 2005),
availableat http://www.designinganalogchips.com (follow "Download Book" hyperlink).
9. Id. at 11-3.
10. The 555 Timer IC An Interview With Hans Camenzind - The Designer Of The Most
Successful Integrated Circuit Ever Developed, http://semiconductormuseum.com/
Transistors/LectureHall/ Camenzind (follow "Camenzind_lndex.htm" hyperlink).
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since its introduction.1 1 Hans Camenzind, the original developer of the 555
Timer, describes its early history:
There are no patents on the 555. Signetics did not want to apply for a
patent. You see, the situation with patents in Silicon Valley in 1970
was entirely different than it is now. Everybody was stealing from
everybody else. I designed the 555 and Signetics produced it, and
before a year later, National had it, Fairchild had it, and nobody paid
any attention to patents. The people at Signetics told me they didn't
want to apply for a patent, because what would happen if they tried to
enforce that patent is, the people from Fairchild would come back with
a Manhattan-sized telephone book
' 2 and say, "These are our patents, now
let's see what you're violating."'
The proliferation of the 555 by other companies illustrates the
cutthroat nature of the semiconductor industry in its infancy. But today,
more than ever, large semiconductor companies encourage their rivals to
enter cross-licensing agreements. 3 In these agreements, one firm may have
to pay a one-time licensing fee to the other, depending upon the quantity of
IP at stake and the volume of the sales involved. 4 For example, I.B.M.
paid a one-time 'balancing payment' of $10 million to Intergraph in 2003,15
in a cross-licensing agreement that was the result of a patent dispute.
Seldom the debtor in such arrangements, I.B.M. generates over $1 billion
in yearly revenue simply from licensing its patent portfolio to other
companies.' 6 Qualcomm, which holds patents essential to the function of
many of the world's cell phones, 7 earned about sixty percent of its 2005
profits in royalties from agreements licensing its technologies to other
semiconductor companies.' 8

Rostky,
The 555: a timer nobody needed, EE TIMES ONLINE,
11. George
http://www.eetimes.com/specia/specialissues/millennium/milestones/camenzind.htm.
12. The 555 Timer IC, supra note 10, available at http://www.semiconductormuseum.com/
Transistors/LectureHall/Camenzind/CamenzmdPage9.htm.
13. Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and StandardSetting, in I INNOVATION POL'Y AND THE ECON. 119, 129-30 (2001), available at
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/thicket.pdf (if viewing online, go to page 12) (last visited Apr,
2007).
14. Id.
Claims,
available
at
15. Agreement
to
Resolve
Patent
Infringement
http://contracts onecle.com/intergraph/ibm.settle.2003.01 30.shtml
16. Bruce V. Bigelow, Patent payoff; By cultivating revenue growth through licensing, more U.S.
companies are marketing their intellectual property, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, May 14, 2006 at HI.
17. The Year In The Real Markets: 1999 Highlights; The Ring of Real Money, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3,
2000, at C17 availableat http://www.nytimes.com (search for "ring of real money" (with quotes)) (last
visited Oct. 10, 2007).
18. Bigelow, supra note 16.
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2. The nature of semiconductor manufacturing originally allowed
companies to duplicate each other's chips with little or no original
effort.
The 555 Timer was by no measure a complicated chip, containing
only twenty-five transistors," compared with Intel's 4004 microprocessor,
also released in 1971, which had 2,300 transistors.2 But despite the 555's
simplicity, other companies barely tried to conceal the overt nature of their
The process by which chips are manufactured involves
clones.
photolithography, where microscopic circuit patterns are inscribed upon a
chip by bright light, which is shone through a complex stencil. 21 This
stencil is called a mask.22 Hans Camenzind describes evidence of just how
identical the competing chips were to the original 555 Timer:
There was one resistor, which I had made just a straight line. So the
resistance is given by the [length] and the width. It turned out that it
would be better to make this resistor larger, but of course if we had
made it larger, then we would have had to change the whole mask. So
we put in a meander-a snake line meandering back and forth so the
total distance was longer. Well, the identical resistor was found in all
the copies. So, it was strictly that they took a photograph and remade a
mask without actually going to the bother of designing the circuit. This
was just common practice by everybody. Signetics did it, and this was
done by the biggies-Fairchild, Texas Instruments, Motorola-all the
big competitors.'3

3. The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act (SCPA) was enacted with the
intention of preventing unscrupulous copying of chip designs. It has
seldom been litigated.
Frustrated with the unscrupulous copying that was common in the
industry, manufacturers tried to obtain copyright protection for their
semiconductor masks. 24 The U.S. Copyright Office, while it would accept
schematic design drawings for protection, refused to protect the masks

19. CAMENZIND, supra note 8, at 11-4.
20. Chris Gaither, Technology Briefing: Hardware;Moore Leaving Intel Board, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
12, 2001, at C6.
21. VIVIEN IRISH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS FOR ENGINEERS 57 (IEE 2005).
22. STEVE M. KAPLAN, WILEY ELECTRICAL AND ELECTRONICS ENGINEERING DICTIONARY 454

(John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2004)
23. Interview with Hans Camenzind, President, Array Designs, in S.F., Cal. (Mar. 30, 2007).
24. Carl A. Kukkonen, The Need To Abolish Registration For Integrated Circuit Topographies
Under TRIPS, 38 IDEA 105, 107-08 (1997).
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because of their utilitarian nature. 25 Lobbying efforts escalated, and in
1984 Congress passed the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act, or SCPA.26
The SCPA creates a distinct form of IP protection to prevent chip
"cloning," which is the process of creating masks from photographs of the
inside of a competitor's chip, so that a duplicate chip can be fabricated with
no design effort.27 However, the SCPA contains an exception for reverse
engineering, which is the process of photographing the inside of the chip
and studying and analyzing the photograph, in order to create another
semiconductor chip product that competes with the first one.28 This clause
narrows the protection of the SCPA, so that the process of copying a chip
will pass muster if it involves sufficient efforts by the copyist.29 In
reviewing an infringement verdict involving the defense of reverse
engineering, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit approved jury
instructions that told jurors to "place great weight on the paper trail" of the
This test may be manipulable by a defendant, as it
defendant.3"
"accentuates the requirement that the defendant expend great time and
effort in
studying the plaintiffs design in order to create an original mask
3
work." '
A 1990 paper by Robert Risberg questioned the SCPA's efficacy after
it had gone largely unlitigated for six years since its enactment, despite that
patent infringement suits in the semiconductor industry continued. 32 Two
years later, the Federal Circuit affirmed a jury finding that AMD infringed
another company's masks under the SCPA, along with a $25-million
damages verdict. 33 And a 2005 decision by the Ninth Circuit affirmed a
liability verdict under the SCPA where $30.6 million in damages was
awarded. 34 But these notable cases notwithstanding, there have been few
claims brought under the SCPA since its inception. This may be
attributable to the manufacturing capabilities of the largest semiconductor
companies, which have become so advanced that other companies simply
do not have the capacity to replicate them. 35 Also, modem microprocessors
and other highly complex chips are sold with a high level of manufacturer
support, including development tools, advertising, and customer support,
25. Id.
26. Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (2000).
27. Kukkonen, supra note 24, at 110.
28. Semiconductor Chip Protection Act, 17 U.S.C. § 906 (1988).
29. Lee Hsu, Reverse Engineering Under the Semiconductor Chip ProtectionAct- Complications
for Standardof Infringement, 5 ALB L.J. SCI. & TECH. 249, 263-264 (1996).
30. Brooktree Corp v Advanced Micro Devices, Inc, 977 F.2d 1555, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
31. Hsu, supra note 29, at 263.
32. Robert L. Risberg, Jr, Five Years Without Infringement Litigation Under The Semiconductor
Chip Protection Act: Unmasking The Spectre Of Chip Piracy In An Era Of Diverse And Incompatible
Process Technologies, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 241, 262-63 (1990).
33. Brooktree, 977 F,2d at 1583.
34. Altera Corp. v. Clear Logic, Inc., 424 F.3d 1079, 1081 (9th Cir. 2005).
35. Kukkonen, supra note 24, at 136.
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which potential copyists are ill-equipped to provide.36
Risberg argues that the SCPA is less relevant in view of a "virtual
renaissance" in the predictability and protection of patent law since the
creation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.37 But he hints that
"more subtle types of copying still occur."38 Echoing this sentiment more
flippantly, independent chip designer Hans Camenzind says, "Everyone
was hoping [the SPCA] would stop direct optical copying. It doesn't worknobody's using it, period. 39 Perhaps the paucity of SCPA lawsuits belies a
sense of lawlessness in the market for small-volume chips.
4. Trade secret law cannot protect integrated circuits that are shipped into
commerce, ripe for reverse engineering.
In bringing a new chip to market, thwarting copyists is so strong a
concern that it can negatively affects a semiconductor company's incentive
to file a patent application.4 ° While patents provide strong protection
against proven infringers, the requisite disclosure of a patent filing often
outweighs the potential enforcement benefits because infringement can be
so difficult to detect in semiconductor chips. 41 Some large companies
seeking to enforce patents hire pseudo-legal teams of "patent miners" to
identify valuable patents and search industry publications for evidence of
infringement.42 Other semiconductor manufacturers may prefer to operate
under the patent radar, considering their work to be "secret," either in the
legal sense or in a more prosaic one.43 Legal protection of trade secrets has
long been available for fabrication processes that are not made evident by
the finished product. 44 A semiconductor executive describes the decision to
retain one such technique as a trade secret: "There's a huge amount of IP
that goes into where we place [a particular circuit] within the chip. There's
no way anyone outside could see how we do it. We felt a patent would be

36. Id. at 137.
37. Risberg, Jr., supra note 32, at 245.
38. Id.
39. Interview with Hans Camenzind, supra note 23.
40. Interview with David Lidsky, Vice President of Design Engineering, Volterra Semiconductor,
in Oakland, Cal. (Apr. 7, 2007) ("If we do a neat, innovative little circuit inside, we're not going to
patent it ...that's just telling someone how to do it. We're not going to tear [into] someone's
silicon ...to see that they're doing it. So patenting it isn't going to give us any advantage.").
41. Id.
42. Shapiro, supra note 13, at 121 (ifviewing online, go to page 3).
43. Interview with Hans Camenzind, supra note 23. ("1 don't think ideas are dying off; they're
strong as ever. It's just that . . . some ideas are simply not disclosed anymore. They're treated as
secrets, rather than as public knowledge. I don't know whether it's a disadvantage. It probably slows
progress a little bit. The big ideas are still in the framework of the patent system.").
44. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Co., 416 U.S. 470, 475 (1974).
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a recipe for doing it." 45
If a secret is manifested on a chip, though, it is not likely to be eligible
for trade secret protection. Circuits themselves are placed in the stream of
commerce once a chip is sold, making it unfeasible to meet the trade secret
standard46 of "efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to
maintain... secrecy."4 7 Some semiconductor companies spare no effort to
reverse-engineer competitors' chips, taking microscopic pictures of the
layers of metal and silicon sandwiched within. 8 This has become more
difficult as the manufacturing process has enabled incremental reductions
in the size of semiconductor chips.49 As chips have shrunken in size and
burgeoned in density, companies have struggled to cope with the sprawling
scale of reverse-engineering projects. "We'd have to take thousands of
pictures," said one industry professional."
The pictures had to be
painstakingly matched and stitched together, so the company would rely on
contractors. 5' "They were retirees, art majors-a very interesting collection
of people. Some said it was better than doing a puzzle, but other people
would try it once and never come back again. By the early '90s, we needed
to take the photographs off the carpet."52
In reverse engineering,
companies also use chemical solvents to dissolve a chip's topmost layers of
circuitry, so that buried layers can be examined and photographed. 3
All of this makes trade secret protection a very risky bet for circuits,
because there is simply no way to prevent the determined (and wellfunded) reverse engineer from delving into a chip and documenting its
inner workings. To protect semiconductor IP, a chip designer must either
be very confident that his chip cannot be reverse engineered to reveal his
secret, or he must apply for a patent.
B. DISINCENTIVES TO PATENTING INTEGRATED CIRCUITS

The first part of this paper addressed strong incentives for patenting
circuit IP. This section raises some negative considerations that militate
45. Interview with David Lidsky, supra note 40.
46. Kukkonen, supranote 24, at 108.
47. Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1, 14 U.L.A. 433 (1990).
48. Jeffrey D. Sullivan & Thomas M. Morrow, Practicing Reverse Engineering In an Era Of
Growing Constraints Under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act and Other Provisions, 14 ALB. L.J.
SCI. & TECH. 1, 16 n.58 (2003).
49. Andrew Pollack, BUSINESS TECHNOLOGY, New Chip Method May Be Put Off, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 12, 1990, at D .
50. Alan S. Brown, Tearing Down the Nearly Invisible, MECHANICAL ENGINEERING, Aug., 2006,
available at http://www.memagazine.org/aug06/features/teanng/teanng.html.
51. Id
52. Id.
53. Sullivan & Morrow, supra note 48, at 16 n.58.
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against patenting.
1. A new chip will almost certainly infringe some patents.
It is very difficult to design a microprocessor or other large chip
without infringing some competitor's patent. 4 Chips are composed of
hundreds of circuits and assemblies, many of which may already be
patented. 5 Determining whether a new product infringes the patents of a
competitor may involve a patent search spanning years of disclosures by
both the competitor and other companies. A new chip, designed as an
original effort, may still contain thousands of technologies owned by rivals,
suppliers, or manufacturers.56 Some of this may be attributable to the
movement of design engineers among semiconductor companies, and the
impossibility of their memorizing a "chain of title" for every individual
circuit block they employ in their work.57 This problem frequently arises in
the context of trade secrets, with semiconductor companies suing former
employees who appropriate their trade secrets in working for competitors. 58
A chip made for a limited market will probably never be scrutinized
for infringement by other companies. Asked about the job of pursuing
infringement in the modem world of circuit design, Hans Camenzind says,
54. Shapiro, supra note 13, at 121 (if viewing online, go to page 2).
55. Risberg, Jr., supra note 32, at 265.
In practice, however, many new chips are not developed from scratch. More
typically, new chips often include previously patented circuits or processes.
Because broadly claimed patents can cover more than one embodiment, a
fundamental idea in any structure can be protected. And while the average chip
product may have only a two or three year life, most meaningful technological
advances often have a far longer life.
Id.
56. Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis & Bronwyn H. Hall, The Effects of Strengthening Patent Rights on
Firms Engaged in Cumulative Innovation. Insights from the Semiconductor Industry, in
ENTREPRENEURIAL INPUTS AND OUTCOMES: NEW STUDIES OF ENTREPRENEUR SHIP IN THE UNITED
STATES 133, 145-46 (Gary D. Libecap ed., 2001).

As some pointed out, a given semiconductor product (say, a new memory or
logic device) will often embody hundreds if not thousands of 'potentially
patentable' technologies that could be owned by suppliers, manufacturers in
other industries, rivals, design finns, or independent inventors. With the
strengthening of US patent rights, the expected benefits of amassing portfolios of
'legal rights to exclude' (for offensive and defensive reasons) began to outweigh
their costg.
Id.
57. Interwith with David Lidsky, supra note 40.
58. Risberg, Jr., supra note 32, at 253 n.62. "The subject of the trade secret must not be in the
public domain or within the knowledge of a particular trade or business." Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron
Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475 (1974). "Trade secret law is often applied against employees or former
employees in the semiconductor industry because of high employee turnover rates." Risberg, Jr., supra
note 32, at 253 n.62.

Winter 2008]

SEMICONDUCTOR PATENT INCENTIVES

For dense modem circuits, the pursuit of patent infringement is only
carried out for very visible circuits, like a microprocessor, or something
like that; high volume, expensive, where you can justify the cost. You
may have a team of three people working for six months to just see
what your competitor has in their chip ....But for any other productand they make 50,000
a custom circuit that's made for a little company
59
or 100,000 pieces a year-it's not worth it.
Such economies of scale may encourage smaller companies to avoid

filing patents that might attract aggression from larger companies seeking
cross-licenses. This suggests that companies with fewer resources will
have less incentive to file for patent protection than their larger
counterparts.
2. The law of willful infringement discourages engineers from reading
patents, stultifying the process of invention. A recent Federal Circuit ruling
may address this problem.
As discussed in the preceding section, the process of designing a chip
is a complex and creative endeavor, and can incorporate hundreds or
thousands of "potentially patentable" technologies for which adverse
patents may be held.6" A chip designer cannot know that his work is
blocked by an existing patent, any more than a musician can know that a
tune popping into his head has already been copyrighted. Worse, there is
the possibility that after a chip is designed and produced, an adverse patent
will issue from an application that has lingered in the Patent Office,
creating a wellspring of liability. This situation is called hold-up.6
One would think that such possibilities would encourage engineers
and their managers to survey the patents in their fields, as a soldier sweeps
for mines in his path. But the semiconductor industry operates in constant
fear of liability for willful infringement. Until 2007, Federal Circuit
doctrine permitted judges to impose treble damages6 2 where a potential
infringer, having actual notice of another's patent rights, failed to seek
counsel before practicing the patented matter. 63 As a result, "actual notice"
has been considered the sine qua non of willful infringement; the Federal
Circuit has stated that "a party cannot be found to have 'willfully' infringed
a patent of which the party had no knowledge. 64 So, the argument goes,
59. Interview with Hans Camenzind, supra note 23.
60. Ziedonis & Bronwyn, supra note 56, at 145-46.
61. Shapiro, supra note 13, at 121 (if viewing online, go to page 3)
62. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000).
63. Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389-90 (Fed. Cir. 1983),
overruled by In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
64. Gustafson, Inc. v. Intersystems Indus. Prods., Inc., 897 F.2d 508, 511 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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the best way to avoid enhanced damages for infringement is to avoid all
contact with issued patents. This axiom has led many technology
companies to forbid patent searches among its employees. Linus Torvalds,
development coordinator for the open-source Linux kernel, says, "Ask any
lawyer in a tech company (off the record, so that he can be honest too), and
he'll tell you that engineers should absolutely not try to look up other
people's patents. It's not their job, and you don't want them tainted." 65
Mark Lemley has argued that discouraging engineers from reading patents
in order to avoid willful infringement leads directly to a subversion of the
patent law's disclosure incentive, because it frustrates the dissemination of
ideas through patents.66 If engineers don't read patents relevant to their
work, to whom are those patents intended to disclose their underlying
ideas? Lemley also points out that when companies are ignorant of one
another's patents, inventors receive less compensation for their ideas.67
Licensing arrangements that might benefit both patent holders and
licensees cannot be identified if everyone wears blinders.
In August of 2007, the Federal Circuit revisited the duty to seek
68
counsel in the en banc hearing of In re Seagate Technology, LLC.
Overruling its own case law, the court declared that "recklessness" is the
lowest measure of intent appropriate for a finding of willful infringement.69
In contrast, the duty of care announced in Underwater Devices sets a
lower threshold for willful infringement that is more akin to negligence.
This standard fails to comport with the general understanding of
willfulness in the civil context, and it allows for punitive
damages in a
70
manner inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent.
The court recognized the changing times since Underwater Devices:
"[The Underwater Devices] standard was announced shortly after the
creation of the court, and at a time 'when widespread disregard of patent
rights was undermining the national innovation incentive. ,, 7 1 One possible
inference from the court's rationale is that actual notice of a competitor's
patent is no longer sufficient for a finding of willfulness. Time will tell
whether Seagate eases the minds of corporate attorneys and engineering
managers fearful of allowing employees to read patents. The court's
explicit overruling of a cornerstone case of willful infringement is

65. Steve Lohr, Technology; I.B.M. 's Opponent in Suit Criticizes Linux Advocate, N.Y. TIMES,
June 18, 2003, at C6.
66. Mark A. Lemley & Ragesh K. Tangri, Ending Patent Law's Willfulness Game, 18 Berkeley
Tech. L.J. 1085, 1100-1101 (2003).
67. Id. at 1121.
68. 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
69. Id. at *20-*21 (citing Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 127 S. Ct 2201, 2209 (2007)).
70. Id. at *21 -*22 (internal citations omitted).
7 1. Id at * 15 (quoting Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d
1337, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en banc)).
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encouraging, along with the suggestion in Seagate that the standard for
willfulness 72be an objective risk of infringement, as defined by standards of
commerce.

3. Courts have not adopted a stable doctrine of interpretation for crosslicense agreements common in the semiconductor industry.
Semiconductor companies are increasingly outsourcing their
manufacturing operations to foundries overseas.73 One consequence of
such outsourcing may be collaboration between foundries and design firms
to subvert the patent rights of other companies. In Intel v. International
Trade Commission, Intel and Atmel Corporation both appealed to the
Federal Circuit a finding of the ITC that Atmel was infringing Intel's patent
by importing certain Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memories
(EPROMs) into the U.S.74 Atmel had arranged to have EPROMs of its own
design75 manufactured by a foundry owned by Sanyo.76 Sanyo had
previously entered a broad cross-licensing agreement with Intel.77 In the
agreement, Intel granted Sanyo a worldwide, royalty-free license to make,

Id. at *23 n.5.
John Markoff, Forget Computers. Here Comes the Sun. N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2006, at C1.
Intel Corp. v. U. S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 946 F.2d 821, 824 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
In the agreement, it was Atmel's responsibility to develop new EPROM designs. Appellee's
12, Intel Corp. v. U. S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 946 F.2d 821 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (No. 89-1459).
Intel, 946 F.2d at 826.
The licensing arrangement provides:
3.5 Intel hereby grants and will grant to Sanyo an [sic] non-exclusive, worldwide royalty-free license without the right to sublicense except to its
Subsidiaries, under Intel Patents which read on any Sanyo Semiconductor
Material, Semiconductor Device, Magnetic Bubble Memory Device, Integrated
Circuit and Electronic Circuit products, for the lives of such patents, to make, use
and sell such products.
3.6 Sanyo hereby grants and will grant to Intel a non-exclusive world-wide,
royalty-free, license without the right to sublicense except to its Subsidiaries,
under Sanyo Patents which read on any Intel Semiconductor Material,
Semiconductor Device, Magnetic Bubble Memory Device, Integrated Circuit and
Electronic Circuit products, for the lives of such patents to make, use and sell
such products.
Id. at 826 n.9.
The agreement defines the term "Intel Patents" broadly, covering "any and all"
patents that Intel "owns or controls," including those of its subsidiaries. The
only limitations in paragraph 3.5 are that Sanyo (1) may not sublicense, except to
subsidiaries, and (2) may only make, use and sell "Sanyo... products. Atmel's
argument is that the "Sanyo" limitation precludes only "have made" rights, and
Sanyo otherwise has an unlimited, royalty-free right to practice all Intel patents.
Id. Put another way, anything manufactured by Sanyo that utilizes any Intel
patent is subject to the royalty-free license of paragraph 3.5.
Id at 828.
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use, and sell Sanyo products covered by any Intel patents.7 Atmel argued
before the Federal Circuit that its EPROMs did not infringe Intel's patents
because they were manufactured under Sanyo's license with Intel.7 9 This
amounted to a defense of patent exhaustion.8" The court, conditioning the
exhaustion doctrine on construction of the license,81 reasoned that the
limitation of the license to "Sanyo products" precluded Atmel from
exhausting Intel's patent rights by sourcing its chips from Sanyo.82
In the inapposite Federal Circuit case of Intel v. ULSI, Intel sought to
prevent ULSI from importing chips made in an HP foundry that operated
under a cross-license with Intel.83 ULSI had designed a co-processor that
worked in conjunction with Intel's 80386 processor.84 ULSI arranged to
have the co-processor manufactured at HP's facility, which both believed
was shielded from suit under the cross-license agreement with Intel. 85 The
United States District Court for the District of Oregon issued a preliminary
injunction against ULSI, which appealed to the Federal Circuit. This time,
the Federal Circuit found that the cross-license between Intel and its
licensee was not limited to those products that would be marketed by the
licensee itself.8 6 The court held that HP's sale of the chips to ULSI, despite
that ULSI provided the design, was sufficient to trigger the first-sale
doctrine and exhaust Intel's patent rights with respect to those chips.8 7
These cases illustrate that the cross-licensing agreements so prevalent
in the semiconductor industry are susceptible of broad, perhaps unintended
interpretations. The facts of ULSI create a roadmap for a company wishing
to circumvent the patents of a larger rival: Approach the rival's crosslicensee and negotiate a "foundry" arrangement, where the licensee will
accept design specifications and manufacture chips under the safe umbrella
of the license.88 I.B.M. has reportedly begun charging a higher fee when it
provides foundry services under circumstances like these, in exchange for
indemnification against patent infringement in connection with the
arrangement.89
In its 2007 term, the Supreme Court will determine whether a
patentee's rights are exhausted by a licensee's sale of goods in Quanta
78. Idat 826.
79. Id.
80. Mark J. Rozman, Intel v ULSI System Technology, Inc., I J. INTELL. PROP L. 373, 382 (1994)
(interpreting Atmel's defense as one of patent exhaustion).
81. Id.
82. Intel, 946 F.2d at 828.
83. Intel Corp. v. ULSI Sys. Tech. Inc., 995 F.2d 1566, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
84. Id
85. Id. at 1569.
86. Id.at 1571.
87. Id.at 1569.
88. Id.at 1567.
89. Ziedonis & Bronwyn, supranote 56, at 171 n.9.
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Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc.90 The case involves the license of a
patent from LG to Intel. The license permitted Intel to sell certain
processors and chipsets to computer manufacturers. 9' In exchange, though,
Intel agreed to notify its customers that the license from LG did not permit
the Intel chips to be combined with non-Intel products.92 LG sued several
Intel customers for infringement, and they asserted a defense of patent
exhaustion. LG's patent rights, they argued, had been exhausted by Intel's
sale of the chips.93 The district court agreed, granting summary judgment
of non-infringement.94 The Federal Circuit reversed this ruling, holding
that the license from LG to Intel, which was conditioned on Intel's
notifying its customers about the legal dangers of combining the chips with
non-Intel components, did not effect exhaustion of LG's patent rights.95
The Federal Circuit noted that LG's patents did not cover the chips
sold by Intel, but the combination of those chips with external
components. 96 The Supreme Court's decision will weigh the enforceability
of the carefully drawn Intel-LG license against the traditional "first sale"
doctrine of exhaustion, which it stated succinctly in the 1942 Univis case,
involving the sale of patented lenses to a manufacturer of eyeglasses:
Our decisions have uniformly recognized that the purpose of the patent
law is fulfilled with respect to any particular article when the patentee
has received his reward for the use of his invention by the sale of the
article, and that once that purpose is realized the patent law affords no
basis for restraining the use and enjoyment of the thing sold. 97
If the Court invalidates the restrictive terms of LG's license to Intel, it
will cast doubt on many of the license arrangements in the semiconductor
industry. Companies currently use their patent rights to tailor licensing
agreements with each other, creating the potential for complex bargaining
and a free market for intellectual property. Insofar as the market is
functioning properly, the Supreme Court's decision may limit the ability of
licensors to enter into mutually beneficial agreements, resulting in a less
efficient market.
That said, it may be that the semiconductor market is not functioning
properly, and that a persistent emphasis on licensing has put tremendous
legal power in the hands of a corporate oligopoly. If a patentee is able,
90. LG Elecs, Inc v. Bizcom Elecs, Inc., 453 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 76
U.S.L.W. 3153 (U.S. Sep. 25, 2007) (No. 06-937).

91. Id. at 1368.
92. Id
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

LG Elecs., Inc. v. Bizcom Elecs., Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29906, at *8 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
Id. at *33.
LG Elecs, 453 F.3d at 1370.
Id at 1369.
United States v. Univis Lens Co., Inc., 316 U.S. 241, 251 (1942).
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through private licensing agreements, to exert his rights far downstream of
his own sale or license of goods, then even the most diligent of bona fide
purchasers can have no hope of determining the provenance of his
merchandise. Of course, the LG license that is the subject of the Supreme
Court's grant of certiorari requires that Intel notify its customers of LG's
residual rights. But can the carrying out of the notice function in property
law be delegated to a private company?
C. CIRCUITS THAT PROVIDE EXTERNAL INTERFACES

We have seen that detecting infringement of integrated circuit patents
is expensive and difficult.
Accordingly, designers are tempted to
selectively patent those technologies and circuits that "interface" with other
chips. Unlike deeply embedded circuits, these technologies are at the
valence of a chip or even outside it, and can readily be traced in an
infringement inquiry. The circuits or protocols that a chip uses for external
communication must typically be described in product guides and
datasheets, which are a welcome shortcut in the detection of infringement.
This section will examine the incentives created by a proliferation of
patents on this type of technology.
1. FTC investigations suggest that "interface" patents may be used to gain
unfair competitive advantage through standard-setting.
The FTC recently affirmed a decision finding that Rambus illegally
obtained a monopoly on technologies used in dynamic random access
memory (DRAM) chips by strategically participating in an industry effort
to standardize memory chip technology.98 The FTC found that Rambus
deceived the JEDEC standards organization (the largest in the
semiconductor industry)99 by "participat[ing] in JEDEC's DRAM standardsetting activities for more than four years without disclosing to JEDEC or
its members that it was actively working to develop, and possessed, a
patent and several pending patent applications that involved specific
technologies ultimately adopted in the standards."' '0
The FTC opinion cited a 1992 Rambus business plan as "identifying
the marketing of RDRAM as the number one strategy while simultaneously
articulating a strategy of capturing royalties from SDRAMs by 'be[ing] in a

98. Press Release, FTC, FTC Issues Final Opinion and Order in Rambus Matter (Feb. 5, 2007),
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2007/02/070502rambus.shtm.
99. See Jedec Home Page, www.jedec.org (last visited Oct. 10, 2007).
100. Press Release, FTC, supranote 98.
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position to request patent licensing (fees and royalties) from any
The first RDRAM patent issued to
manufacturer of Sync DRAMs..''
Rambus10 2 describes the "field of the invention" as "an integrated circuit
bus interface for computer and video systems. '0 3
Once Rambus led JEDEC to base the DRAM standard on its patented
technologies, it paid visits to other manufacturers in the same way Hans
Camenzind described Fairchild's aggressive visits in the early 1970's.104
ATI and NVIDIA were among those that received "patent presentations"
(pageants) from Rambus. °5 Rambus was able to create tremendous
leverage with its RDRAM patents not only because the JEDEC standards
body broadly adopted technology for which Rambus had patents, but also
because the technology was for an unconcealed interface, which made
detection of infringement trivial. Any DRAM that was marketed as
compliant with the JEDEC standard would almost certainly infringe
Rambus' patents.
This case should serve to indicate the tremendous power of "interface"
patents relative to patents on circuits. Circuits are, by their nature,
concealed, obscure, and not documented publicly. Interface technology, on
the other hand, must be exhaustively described if the chips of one company
are to be incorporated into the products of another.
2. Courts have considered the coercive effects of "interface monopolies"
unacceptable in cases where electronic interfaces have been protected
through software copyrights rather than patents.
Exclusive rights to circuits which perform "interface" or
"communication" functions can give a company disproportionate leverage,
particularly if the circuit becomes part of a market standard.' °6 In Atari
Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America Inc., Atari became dissatisfied with a
restrictive license granted to it by Nintendo.'1 7 The license allowed Atari to
market only five games per year for the Nintendo Entertainment System
console (NES). Atari, a long-time presence in the video game market,
sought to market its entire existing catalog of games for the NES.
Nintendo employed a copyright "lock-out" system called the IONES to
101. Opinion of the Commission On Remedy, In re Rambus, Inc., p. 15 n.91 (Feb. 2007) available
at http://www.ftc gov/os/adjpro/d9302/070205opinion.pdf.
102. Rambus Inc. v. Infineon Techs. AG, 318 F.3d 1081, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
103. U S.Pat. No. 5,243,703 col. 1.67-68 (filed Mar. 5 1992).
104. Opinion of the Commission On Remedy, supra note 101, at 28 n 163.
105. Id.
106. Robert P. Merges, Who Owns The Charles River Bridge? Intellectual Property and
Competition in the Software Industry, 8 (Apr. 2, 1999) (unpublished manuscript, available at
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/pubs/merges/criver.pdf.
107. Atan Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 836 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
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prevent unlicensed cartridges from working on its console.' l8 This system
required each game cartridge to have a "key" chip, which would interface
with a "lock" chip on the NES console.' °9 Nintendo's licensing regime
required Atari to provide chips containing the finished game code to
Nintendo, which would place them in plastic cartridges containing the
1ONES "key" chip. Nintendo would then resell the cartridges to Atari,
which could finally market them."0 Atari reverse engineered the 1ONES
chip, which it scavenged from a retail-market NES console. The Federal
Circuit found the reverse engineering of the copyrighted chip to be
permissible as fair use, although Atari lost the case on other grounds."'
In the similar case of Sega Enterprises v. Accolade, Inc., the Ninth
Circuit proclaimed that the reverse engineering of a proprietary game
system to achieve compatibility, which resulted in a proliferation of video
games compatible with the system, was "precisely this growth in creative
expression, based on the dissemination of other creative works and the
unprotected ideas contained
in those works, that the Copyright Act was
' 12
intended to promote." "
These cases involve copyrights, which have always provided narrower
rights than patents.
Still, they indicate courts' suspicion of legal
arrangements that allow manufacturers to impose restraints on the use of
their products even after they have been sold. These kinds of restraints
underlie many of the licensing disputes that complicate the patent law
today.

108.
109.
110.
111.

Id.
Id.
Id.
The court stated:
Reverse engineering, untainted by the purloined copy of the 1ONES program and
necessary to understand IONES, is a fair use. An individual cannot even observe,
let alone understand, the object code on Nintendo's chip without reverse
engineering. Atari retrieved this object code from NES security chips in its
efforts to reverse engineer the I ONES program. Atari chemically removed layers
from Nintendo's chips to reveal the 1ONES object code. Through microscopic
examination of the 'peeled' chip, Atari engineers transcribed the IONES object
code into a handwritten list of ones and Zeros. While these ones and zeros
represent the configuration of machine readable software, the ones and zeros
convey little, if any, information to the normal unaided observer. Atari then
keyed this handwritten copy into a computer. The computer then 'disassembled'
the object code or otherwise aided the observer in understanding the program's
method or functioning. This 'reverse engineering' process, to the extent untainted
by the 1ONES copy purloined from the Copyright Office, qualified as a fair use.
Id. at 84344 (footnote omitted).
112. Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1523 (9th Cir. 1992).
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CONCLUSION
The semiconductor market faces skewed incentives in the decision to
patent integrated circuit technologies. First, patenting a circuit that is
deeply embedded in a chip holds little promise for either a small or a large
manufacturer. Small manufacturers face increased attention and aggressive
licensing negotiations from larger players if they reveal parts of their chips'
inner workings through patent disclosure. When large companies patent
deeply embedded circuits, they must put forth expensive and timeconsuming efforts to find evidence that other companies are actually
infringing their patents, because of the needle-in-a-haystack nature of
individual circuits in complex chips. For both large and small companies,
there is the threat that a patent disclosure will simply be co-opted by
another manufacturer, who will exploit the patentee's technology in a chip
too obscure to ever be detected.
Second, there is the temptation to focus patenting efforts on
technologies and circuits that "interface" with other chips. Unlike deeply
embedded circuits, these are easily detected in an infringement inquiry.
Such circuits are often incorporated into industry standards, so that any
patents relating to them are assured a steady stream of royalty revenues
when consumer demand for a standard picks up.
The incentive for disclosure in the patent system is skewed towards
those semiconductor discoveries which are the easiest to detect. Circuits
which really do benefit the industry are often not disclosed, because they
don't seem enforceable through evidence of infringement. Patents which
are obtained primarily for their leverage in non-adjudicated license
negotiations and industry cross-licenses are not likely to disclose the most
novel innovations of an industry. Therefore, the growing library of patents
in the semiconductor field is not adequately disclosing the state of the art to
the public. The quid pro quo of the patent system is subverted when the
patent holder obtains exclusive rights to his invention without fully
disclosing how it works.
Finally, industrial paranoia about enhanced damages for willful patent
infringement has led to a culture in which engineers and their managers
avoid reading or considering patents. The "wisdom" in the industry is that
reading patents in the design process, even in good faith, can lead directly
to a finding of willful infringement. The efficient exchange of ideas for a
reasonable royalty rate is one of the patent system's most tangible
promises, but it is thwarted by the widely-held notion that looking at what
other companies have done is poisonous to success. Instead of looking in
the patent literature for a ready-made solution to an incipient problem,
semiconductor companies prefer to reinvent the wheel, barricading
themselves from any possible claim of willful infringement.
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